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I. INTRODUCTION
The publication last year of an "interim report" on "Asbestos Litigation
Costs and Compensation" by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice led a
number of legal commentators to conclude that plaintiff asbestos lawyers
were largely responsible for a litigation epidemic that harms the American
economy and results in injustice.' Stuart Taylor, Jr., a reflective and
intelligent legal journalist, wrote a hard-hitting piece in Legal Times under
the following lead: "The Greedy v. The Sick: Lawyers are using asbestos
claims to cheat the rest of us." 2  "This scandal," Taylor argued,
"...dramatizes how our lawsuit industry often operates as an engine of
injustice - and as a drain on the economy, an inadequate vehicle for
compensating people actually harmed by corporate wrongdoing, and a
transparent fraud in its pretensions to punish those responsible for such
wrongdoing."
3
Roger Parloff's lengthier article in Fortune had the following leads:
"The $200 Billion Miscarriage of Justice; Asbestos lawyers are pitting
plaintiffs who aren't sick against companies that never made the stuff - and
extracting billions for themselves."4 Parloff, a knowledgeable and able legal
commentator, concludes that "[tihe course of asbestos litigation over the past
30 years has been shaped less by the law of torts than by the law of
unintended consequences. At every turn, well-intentioned court rulings
have, in the fullness of time, backfired..." [by stimulating plaintiff lawyers
to file many cases involving claimants with little or no disability]. 5
Defendants, faced with huge case aggregations that threatened
bankruptcy if a trial were lost, entered into settlements that inevitably put a
relatively high price tag on the less serious claims. The result, predictably:
even more cases and inevitable bankruptcy.6 Parloff concludes that the
injustice can only be cured by piggybacking global settlements onto
bankruptcy proceedings (a form of judicial activism) or, if a number of
leading plaintiff law firms cooperate, targeted federal legislation that would
have a similar result.
7
Lester Brickman, who earlier proposed an administrative scheme for
resolution of asbestos claims,8 views the current situation as a "malignancy
in the courts" that primarily benefits only the twenty or so plaintiff law firms
I. Stephen J. Carroll et al., Asbestos Litigation Costs and Compensation: An Interim Report.
RAND INST. FOR CIv. JUST. (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Rand Report].
2. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Greedy vs. The Sick, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at 60 [hereinafter
Taylor, Greedy Lawyers].
3. Id. at 60.
4. Roger Parloff. The $200 Billion Miscarriage of Justice, FORTUNE, Mar. 4, 2002, at 154
[hereinafter Parloff, Miscarriage of Justice].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative
Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819 (1992) [hereinafter Brickman, Asbestos Litigation Crisis].
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who recruit asbestos claimants, process their claims in the courts and
through the trust funds established by bankrupt asbestos-related defendants,
and take a large amount of the total expenditures on asbestos litigation.9 The
malignancy came about:
because asbestos litigation today has come to consist, mainly, of
non-sick people, suing in jurisdictions where asbestos litigation is
one of the main industries supporting the local economy, claiming
compensation for non-existent injuries [from increasingly non-
culpable defendants], often testifying according to prepared scripts
with perjurious contents, and often supported by specious medical
evidence. 10
Brickman, unlike the other commentators, characterizes asbestos
litigation as a "massively fraudulent enterprise," suggesting that criminal
fraud has occurred."
The Rand study, to be followed by further analysis and detailed
consideration of policy choices, provides a neutral and relatively objective
factual basis on which to assess these charges. My conclusion is that
asbestos litigation provides a good example of how the good intentions of
judges can go awry because they fail to take account of the likely
consequences of their actions on the behavior of self-interested participants,
including their own preoccupation with clearing dockets. The asbestos
swamp also illustrates the failure of Congress to provide a public interest
solution to a problem that may be incapable of being resolved satisfactorily,
consistent with the Constitution and the rule of law, by activist judges
working with self-interested plaintiff lawyers and defendant companies.
My assignment, however, is not these broad policy questions but
whether or not the current handling of asbestos cases violates the
disciplinary rules of the legal profession.' 2 First, have the plaintiff lawyers
9. Lester Brickman, Asbestos Litigation: Malignancy in the Courts?. I MEALEY'S ASBESTOS
BANK. REP. #12 (July 2002) [hereinafter Brickman, Malignancy in the Courts] (citing his earlier
article containing extensive discussion of his claims of forum shopping, improper coaching of
claimants' testimony, and use of false medical evidence); Lester Brickman, Lawyers' Ethics and
Fiduciary Obligation in the Brave New World of Aggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y REV. 243 (2001) [hereinafter Brickman, Aggregative Litigation]; id. at 258-65 (forum
shopping); id. at 275-81 (witness coaching); id. at 281-93 (false expert evidence).
10. Brickman, Malignancy in the Courts, supra note 9.
11. Id. Brickman's closing paragraph states that "[tihe issues posed by [today's] asbestos
litigation ... should be seen less as matter of civil justice reform than as matters of law
enforcement." Referring back to criticism of lawyer failures in the savings-and-loan scandals, he
asks, "Where are the prosecutors?" Id.
12. In this article I focus almost entirely on the conduct of plaintiff asbestos lawyers. I do so
because it is their conduct which critics have attacked as one of the root causes of the asbestos crisis.
The defense lawyers, it should be noted, sometimes are implicated in some of the same conduct: e.g.,
they negotiate settlements with plaintiff firms that violate the aggregate settlement rule or involve
impermissible conflicts of interest among the aggregated plaintiffs. If the plaintiff lawyers have
violated ethics rules through the mass screening techniques that produce the
thousands of unimpaired claimants whose recoveries have bankrupted the
culpable defendants and now threaten many other companies whose
culpability is limited or nonexistent? Second, in presenting the claims of
these asbestos claimants, do plaintiff lawyers improperly coach the
testimony of claimants, especially with respect to causation issues (exposure
to asbestos products related to a particular defendant) or offer expert
testimony they know or should know is false? Third, do these lawyers, who
often are representing hundreds or even thousands of claimants against the
same defendants, violate the duty of communication with clients, the client's
control over settlement, and the profession's aggregate settlement rule?
Fourth, in negotiating for these large and amorphous groups of claimants,
containing many unimpaired claimants and a smaller number of seriously
injured asbestosis and mesothelioma victims, are the conflict of interest rules
being violated? Finally, are the fees the plaintiff lawyers garner from
settlement awards excessive and unreasonable?
My conclusions are bound to be a disappointment to anyone who hopes
for confident and unambiguous judgments. There is insufficient evidence
concerning nearly all of the issues listed above to reach a confident
conclusion that ethics rules have been violated. The two exceptions involve
the aggregate settlement rule13 and the presence of pervasive conflicts of
interest. But no one seems to care about any of these issues except for a few
academic writers. Defendants and their counsel, who demand broad
settlements and want but cannot get global peace after Amchem Products v.
Windsor14 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,1 cannot and do not complain
about these ethical violations. Individual clients, who could raise the issues,
have neither the time nor the resources to pursue these issues. State and
federal judges who handle asbestos cases appear to be totally uninterested in
adding professional responsibility concerns or hearings to the already
violated ethics rules by their conduct, the defendant lawyers may also have done so by inducing or
assisting another lawyer to violate a professional rule. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
8.4(a), stating that it is "professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... knowingly assist or induce
another to [violate the Rules of Professional Conduct], or to do so through the acts of another." In
addition, defense lawyers may have been implicated in the asbestos industry's earlier coverup of its
knowledge of the harmfulness of asbestos products. See Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer Conduct in the
"Tobacco Wars." 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 436-37 (2001) (discussing coverup issues in tobacco
representation).
13. The aggregate settlement rule, discussed infra at notes 77-86, refers to the lawyer's duty not
to participate in a settlement involving more than one client unless each client gives informed
consent in writing to the terms of the settlement. See Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, Mass Lawsuits
and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733 (1997) [hereinafter Silver &
Baker, Aggregate Settlement Rule]; Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against Changing the Aggregate
Settlement Rule in Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 149 (1999) [hereinafter Moore, Changing
the Aggregate Settlement Rule]; Steve B. Jensen, Like Lemonade. Ethics Comes Best When It's Old-
Fashioned: A Response to Professor Moore, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 215 (1999) [hereinafter Jensen, Old-
Fashioned Ethics]; Lynn Baker & Charles Silver, The Aggregate Settlement Rule and Ideals of
Client Service, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 227 (1999) [hereinafter Baker & Silver, Settlement Rule and
Ideals of Client Service].
14. 521 U.S. 591 (1997); see infra note 87.
15. 527 U.S. 815 (1999); see infra note 88.
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overwhelming task of clearing dockets of pending asbestos cases. Finally,
state disciplinary bodies will not address them on their own initiative and
appear totally disinterested in launching major investigations in the few
instances in which grievances have been filed.16  Like the manufacture of
sausage, asbestos litigation is a messy endeavor, and no one really wants to
know how the ingredients are put together.
II. ETHICS ISSUES IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION
A. Solicitation of Claimants
Once courts established some special rules for asbestos cases that eased
a plaintiff's burden of proving exposure to a defendant's asbestos products
and the causal relationship between that exposure and the plaintiff's medical
condition, the prospects of plaintiff victory in a jury trial, while still chancy,
were good. 17 The law in a number of jurisdictions also made it possible for a
claimant to recover substantial damages for a nonmalignant claim involving
mild asbestosis or pleural plaques not resulting in serious impairment (i.e.,
inability to work or to carry on other activities of daily living). 8 As a result,
plaintiff lawyers had a great incentive to recruit as many claimants as
possible and to confront defendants in favored forums 9 with a large
caseload of cases ranging from the most severe (mesothelioma) to many
cases involving limited or no impairment.2 ° Confronted by potentially huge
defense costs and worried about errant juries that would occasionally award
16. See infra notes 48-57 (discussing the Baron & Budd memorandum in which the Texas
disciplinary body brushed off the grievance, apparently accepting the law firm's unsworn statements
at face value and not conducting an independent factual investigation).
17. Lester Brickman discussed the "special asbestos tort law" developed by state and federal
judges to ease the difficulties of proof of exposure and causation in Brickman, Asbestos Litigation
Crisis, supra note 8, at 1840-52. Special rules in a number of jurisdictions applying only in asbestos
product liability cases, he concludes, include: disallowing the state-of-the art defense: permitting
proof of exposure through circumstantial and hearsay evidence by other employees; permitting
recovery in cases of mild asbestosis in which undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiff worked
full time and led an active life; permitting recovery for fear of cancer by those with pleural plaques
but no other physical impairment. Id.
18. id. at 1844-52 (discussing Dunn v. Owens-Coming Fibreglas, 774 F. Supp 929 (D.VI.
1991)).
19. Asbestos claims have tended to migrate to jurisdictions that are viewed as "plaintiff friendly"
with favorable tort rules and procedural practices that favor aggregation. 2002 Rand Report, supra
note 1, at 32-37 (discussing the high concentration of asbestos litigation in states and counties having
these characteristics).
20. Id. at 23, 35 (stating that litigation dynamics shifted in favor of plaintiffs in the mid-1980s
when "plaintiff law firms ... learned that they could succeed against asbestos defendants by filing
large numbers of claims, grouping them together and negotiating with defendants on behalf of the
entire group." "Consolidation lof asbestos cases] tilts the playing field against defendants, rather
than against plaintiffs").
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very large sums for slightly injured asbestos victims, defendants pushed for
settlements of all pending cases brought by a plaintiff firm.
Experience demonstrated that these aggregate settlements of large
numbers of cases had the effect of reducing the recoveries of those most
seriously injured (who were also threatened with the danger of dying before
their cases were reached for trial) and providing a substantial recovery for
21
claimants who had limited or no impairment. Plaintiff attorneys responded
by attempting to recruit any and all of those with occupational exposure to
asbestos whose lung X-rays, when examined by a radiologist regularly
employed by the particular law firm, would find pleural plaques or other
lung scarring that might be attributed to asbestos exposure. By encouraging
the filing and settlement of low-value claims, the consolidation efforts,
designed to dispose of cases efficiently, had the opposite effect. The Rand
study concludes "it is highly likely that the steps taken to streamline the
litigation actually increased the total dollars spent on the litigation by
increasing the numbers of claims filed and resolved.
22
By the mid-1980s, plaintiff lawyers, often with the cooperation of labor
unions, were organizing (and presumably financing) mass screening
procedures in which a van equipped with mobile radiographic equipment
would appear at or near a work site and workers over a certain age would be
invited to receive a free chest X-ray. The most detailed description of the
process is found in a 1998 investigative report in the Dallas Observer
describing the process by which Baron & Budd, a leading plaintiff firm in
the asbestos field, obtained new clients through a health screening arranged
by another law firm and a trade union:
23
Together, the union and the local law firm round up a group of
the skilled laborers who constitute Baron & Budd's clientele,
sending out notice of the free screening. The men, many of whom
know someone who died from asbestos disease, come from miles
around.
According to trial testimony from doctors, the union and the
law firm pay for a lung doctor to examine up to 200 men a day
using equipment rented from a local hospital or hauled in by the
doctor in a tractor-trailer rig. The union men are X-rayed, and the
21. Over time, "the average severity of claims is declining in the sense that a growing fraction of
claims are for less severe injuries." Id. at 41. Claims for less severe injuries (nonmalignant claims)
are growing in number at a much faster rate and now constitute ninety percent of all claims. Id. at
45-46. About two-thirds of all dollars paid to asbestos claimants go to those with nonmalignant
injuries. Id. at 65-66. The situation is complicated by the differences in state law concerning whether
pleural plaques resulting from asbestos exposure give rise to a legal claim separate and distinct from
one arising from a subsequent serious impairment or a medical monitoring or fear-of-cancer claim.
See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210 (2003) (finding that fear of cancer was a
recoverable injury).
22. 2002 Rand Report, supra note I, at 26.
23. Christine Biederman et al., Toxic Justice, DALLAS OBSERVER, Aug. 13, 1998 (quoted and
discussed in Brickman, Aggregative Litigation, supra note 9. at 273-81).
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films are usually developed on the spot. Frequently, an attorney is
standing by to sign up anyone whose examinations show any
evidence of asbestos exposure.
After the workers are X-rayed and referred to a lawyer, the
local attorney typically sends the case to [the Firm] .... According
to [a principal of Baron & Budd, ... the referring firm usually gets
up to one-third of Baron & Budd' s 40 percent contingency fee.
24
For non-union workers or those who are dispersed or retired,
advertisements in newspapers, other publications or the electronic media are
used to recruit claimants. For example, a newspaper ad in the Cleveland
Plain Dealer in 1991 read in part: "ATTENTION: Railroad Workers and
Retirees - X-ray screening to determine the presence of asbestos related lung
disease... [offfered at no out of pocket cost to you.' 25  Stewart Taylor
reports the punch line of another advertisement: "Find out if YOU have
MILLION DOLLAR LUNGS."
26
Do these and other efforts to attract legal business violate the
profession's rules prohibiting in-person solicitation? It is clear that the
commercial advertisements, although they may be subject to criticism for
bad taste, are constitutionally protected27 and not reached by the ethics
rules. 28  Written solicitation of particular matters in the form of a
personalized form letter that provides information about a possible legal
problem (e.g., asbestos disease) and the lawyer's availability to provide
assistance, is also constitutionally protected.
29
24. Brickman, Aggregative Litigation, supra note 9, at 274 n.95 (quoting Biederman, supra note
23).
25. CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 9, 1991, at 2C (quoted in Brickman, Asbestos Litigation
Crisis, supra note 8, at 1854 n. 144).
26. Taylor, Greedy Lawyers, supra note 2.
27. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 655 (1985) (striking
down a state disciplinary action against a lawyer whose newspaper ad invited Dalkon Shield claims
to contact the lawyer concerning a possible personal injury claim).
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 7.2(a): "Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and
7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through written, recorded or electronic communication,
including public media." [Hereinafter the A.B.A. Model Rules will be cited as "Model Rule #"].
Neither Model Rule 7.1 nor Model Rule 7.3 prohibits advertising through public media that targets a
particular class of potential clients.
29. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 478-80 (1988) (finding personalized letters
informing home owners facing foreclosure of possible legal problems and the lawyer's availability
to handle them constitutionally protected). But see, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618, 634-35 (1995) (holding a Florida bar rule prohibiting personal injury lawyers from sending
targeted mail to accident victims or their relatives for thirty days following an accident or disaster).
Similar prohibitions have been adopted in a number of states. These prohibitions do not reach
injuries from asbestos exposure that occurred many years ago.
The general prohibition against solicitation extends to indirect
solicitation through the use of agents.3  If a law firm employed a medical
screening outfit, paying it to offer free screening to certain persons in return
for the screening organization referring those with certain characteristics to
the law firm, the solicitation rules may be violated. However, proceeding
through a union or other employee organization, or perhaps limiting the
provision of help and advice to members of a particular organization, raises
associational issues that may very well privilege the conduct. 31 Moreover,
the effort to build aggregations of cases against the same defendant is
analogous to solicitation of members of a class for purposes of bringing a
class action.32  Thus, well-established exceptions to the prohibition of
solicitation may be invoked when unions or health organizations assist
workers in learning whether they have a health problem and simultaneously
refer them to a lawyer. Moreover, it is not clear that the plaintiff asbestos
lawyers are financing all of the testing arrangements; there is the further
complication in the Baron & Budd situation that the actual solicitation was
done by a local lawyer, who then referred the cases to the asbestos law firm.
Presumably the presence of associational interests and other complications is
responsible for the failure of asbestos defendants to file disciplinary
grievances against asbestos plaintiff firms. I am not aware of any discipline
or judicial sanctions being applied to the methods used by plaintiff lawyers
to recruit asbestos clients.
Prominent asbestos lawyers, such as Fred Baron, argue strongly that
their efforts to inform workers of what may be a dangerous health condition
is a major pubic benefit. "I think it's a wonderful thing," Baron says. "If I
have a disease, I want to know about it, and I want to be able to seek
treatment for it." 33  Even though the medical benefits of screening are
dubious34 and the quality of the testing provided is subject to question (see
30. See Model Rule 8.4 (stating a lawyer may not violate the professional rules through the acts
of another) and Rule 7.2(b) (containing prohibitions on paying someone to recommend a lawyer's
services).
31. In In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438-39 (1978), the Court held that in-person solicitation on
behalf of a public or charitable organization could not be prohibited, at least if the solicitation was
not for pecuniary gain and furthered the organization's purposes (lawyer wrote to a woman who had
been sterilized as a condition of continuation of Medicaid benefits, offering her free representation
by American Civil Liberties Union). Other cases have upheld solicitation where associational rights
are involved. See, e.g., In re Teichner, 387 N.E.2d 265. 276-77 (11. 1979) (lawyer visited and
solicited victims of train accident and their families; although his motives were predominantly
pecuniary, his actions furthered community interests in comprehensive relief program and were
"tinged" with associational values): In re Appert, 315 N.w.2d 204 (Minn. 1981) (lawyers who
generated new cases by distributing brochures to inform women of their right to recover for injuries
from intrauterine contraceptive device, and by accepting referrals from non-lawyers, served
"significant public interest" by implicating associational rights). The line of Supreme Court
decisions upholding labor union referral services are also relevant. See, e.g., United Transp. Union
v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
32. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981); see also Model Rule 7.2, cmt. 4 (stating
"communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation"
are not prohibited).
33. Parloff, Miscarriage of Justice, supra note 4.
34. Mesotheolomia is an untreatable disease. Moreover, National Cancer Institute studies
suggest that X-rays catch lung cancer too late to reduce mortality. Thus, the major effect of testing
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the discussion of expert testimony below), Baron's argument has a large
popular appeal. A grievance body that examines and possibly punished the
recruitment methods would be subject to much public criticism and hostility.
B. Presenting False Expert Testimony
Medical evidence of asbestos disease is provided in every asbestos case,
but critics, including an occasional judge, assert that much of that evidence
is "specious."35 The doctors who interpret the X-rays and provide expert
testimony are chosen by the plaintiff law firms. The same physicians are
used in hundreds, perhaps thousands, of cases. The medical evidence
provided to courts and bankruptcy trusts always supports the existence of
some lung condition that is consistent with asbestos exposure.
Evidentiary support for allegations of abuse is provided by a number of
independent studies of the testing process. During one three-year period in
the 1990s, for example, seventy percent of the evaluations received by the
Manville Trust were supplied by eight physicians, leading the trust to initiate
an independent reevaluation of the medical testimony. That study by
independent doctors, using procedures that would confirm the submission if
any reviewing doctor agreed with it, led to the conclusion that thirty-eight
percent of the audited claimants suffered from no asbestos-related condition,
while twenty-eight percent had conditions milder than had been asserted by
the claimants' experts.3 6 Similarly striking differences in outcome occurred
when a federal district judge, rejecting the expert testimony of sixty-five
claimants, appointed independent experts to evaluate their medical records.
Only ten of the sixty-five (fifteen percent) were found to have contracted
asbestosis. 37  Other recent studies, commissioned by asbestos defendants,
have found that from two-thirds to ninety percent of all current claimants
have not suffered an impairment affecting their ability to perform activities
of daily living.38 The 2002 Rand study concludes more modestly that "a
large and growing proportion of the claims entering the system in recent
years were submitted by individuals who have not incurred an injury that
affects their ability to perform activities of daily living."
39
may be to increase the anxiety of those tested who are found to have lung scarring or pleural
plaques.
35. See Brickman, Aggregative Litigation, supra note 9, at 281-94 (arguing that plaintiff asbestos
lawyers retain only X-ray readers who are the most likely to conclude that lung scarring or other
signs that may be related to asbestos exposure are present).
36. See Brickman, Aggregative Litigation, supra note 9, at 285-94 (discussing In re Manville
Pers. Injury Settlement Trust Med. Audit Procedures Litig.).
37. See Carl B. Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, The Use of Court Experts in Asbestos Litigation,
137 F.R.D. 35. 39 (1991), discussed in Brickman, Aggregative Litigation. supra note 9, at 284-85 &
n. 13.
38. 2002 Rand Report, supra note 1. at 20.
39. Id. at 21.
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Ethics rules provide that a "lawyer shall not knowingly ... offer
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false ...,40 and that a "lawyer shall
not ... falsify evidence, [or] counsel or assist a witness to testify
falsely .... Under the disciplinary rules, "knows" or "knowingly" refers
to "actual knowledge," although "knowledge may be inferred from
circumstances .42
Knowledge of falsity cannot be inferred from the choices that plaintiff
lawyers have made of their expert witnesses in asbestos cases. It is
customary for lawyers to search for another expert when those first
consulted are unwilling to provide the necessary supporting evidence.
Moreover, everyone concedes that a large subjective element is involved in
the examination of chest X-rays to reach a diagnosis of asbestosis or a
determination that lung scarring has been caused by asbestos exposure. The
president of the Manville Trust's claims-paying arm "says that the high
audit-failure rates probably do not reflect fraud on anyone's part, but rather
the intrinsic subjectivity of X-ray interpretation, especially when the alleged
diseases are so mild. 'It's more art form than science.'
43
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that plaintiff
asbestos lawyers "know" the medical evidence they submit is "false,"
although they clearly know it is partial and one-sided. The remedy lies not
in professional discipline but in steps that the courts need to take to ensure
reasonably accurate medical testimony is provided: (1) inquiries under the
Daubert rule into the scientific accuracy of the type of testimony routinely
provided;44  (2) procedures that provide defendants with the medical
evidence well before trial and permit defendants to obtain an independent
medical examination of each plaintiff;45 and (3) the appointment of a panel
of independent medical experts to assess each claimant's medical condition
in occasional large-scale cases where the stakes justify additional transaction
costs.
4 6
40. Model Rule 3.3(a)(3).
41. Model Rule 3.4(b).
42. Model Rule 1.0(f) (defining "knowingly," "known," and "knows").
43. See Parloff. Miscarriage of Justice, supra note 4, at 7. Brickman, who characterizes the
expert evidence submitted by plaintiff firms in asbestos cases as "specious" or "fraudulent,"
concedes that "[i]n many cases, reading the X-ray is like taking a Rorschacht test; whatever is there
is totally in the eyes of the beholder." Brickman, Aggregative Litigation, supra note 9, at 283.
Nevertheless, lawyers who select an expert witness when past experience provides knowledge that
there is a high probability that the witness will provide a favorable opinion are skirting the edge of
professional misconduct even though they are not knowingly falsifying evidence. See Model Rule
8.4(a) (inducing another to violate the law) and 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice).
44. See David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV.
(forthcoming Dec. 2003) (discussing the need for use of Daubert procedures in asbestos litigation).
45. Until 2003, Mississippi, one of the leading forums for asbestos litigation, had no procedure
by which a trial court could order a medical examination of a personal injury plaintiff. In other
states, it is reported that defendants in multi-claimant consolidations set for trial are frequently given
the medical evidence only a short time before the scheduled trial, preventing examination and
deposition of the plaintiffs' experts. See Brickman, Aggregative Litigation, supra note 9, at 258-65.
46. This was the approach followed by Judge Rubin in a federal court case involving 65 tire
workers who claimed asbestos exposure injuries. See Carl B. Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, The Use
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C. Improper Coaching of Claimants' Testimony
Presentation of an asbestos claim requires the claimant to testify about
the presence of the asbestos products manufactured or sold by the defendants
named in the case. Presentation of such testimony poses great difficulties.
Asbestos products disappeared from the marketplace in the mid 1970s. The
exposure of most plaintiffs dates back thirty to forty years. The claimant's
work history can usually be recreated from Social Security records, but the
claimant's knowledge or recollection of which company manufactured the
products that were present at particular work sites at specified times long
ago is likely to be dim or nonexistent. Because of the difficulties of proof
and a knowledge that the most severe asbestos claims, such as
mesothelioma, have been caused by occupational exposure to asbestos
fibers, a number of courts have assisted plaintiffs by allowing the exposure
requirement to be satisfied by the hearsay testimony of another employee
concerning the presence of a product at a particular work site.
But there is a further problem. The principal manufacturers of asbestos
products in the United States were sent into bankruptcy a number of years
ago and the trusts that distribute the funds set aside in the bankruptcy
proceeding for future claimants have either been exhausted or pay pennies
on the dollar.47 The plaintiff lawyer has the task of establishing that the
solvent defendants named in today's litigation were the major contributors to
the plaintiff's injury. This involves a "recollection" or "learning" process
that leads to charges of improper coaching and false testimony.
A rare inside glimpse of suspect witness coaching came to light in 1997
when a 20-page document entitled "Preparing for Your Deposition" used by
Baron & Budd, one of the largest of the Rlaintiff firms, was inadvertently
given to defense counsel in a pending case.
The memo suggests the following scenario in the likely situation that the
client cannot remember what products containing asbestos were used at the
work site. When that occurs, the paralegal conducting the witness
of Court Experts in Asbestos Litigation, 137 F.R.D. 35 (1991) (discussed in Brickman, Aggregative
Litigation, supra note 9, at 284-85 & n. 113). The migration of asbestos cases from federal to state
courts may limit the availability of this option because state judges have less authority and
willingness to appoint neutral experts than do federal judges. Id.
47. Manville, Raymark, and other leading manufacturers of asbestos products have gone into
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy created trusts that administer compensation plans for the benefit of
future claimants. Current claimants lose because many trusts pay only a tiny fraction of agreed upon
losses (the Manville Trust currently pays at the rate of five cents on the dollar). As of 2002, sixty
companies had filed for bankruptcy because of asbestos liabilities. As these companies go bankrupt,
non-bankrupt firms become the target of more litigation. 2002 Rand Report, supra note 1, at 67-68.
48. For discussion of the Baron & Budd memorandum, see Lester Brickman & Ronald Rotunda,
When Witnesses Are Told What to Say, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1998, at AI5; Brickman, Aggregative
Litigation, supra note 9, at 275-81; Joan C. Rogers, Ethics of Witness Preparation, ABA/BNA, 14
LAW. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 48-54 (Feb. 18, 1998). The following discussion in the text is based on
these sources, which excerpt and discuss the memorandum.
preparation informs the client that other employees have testified that certain
products were used at that site in those years (this information comes from
the firm's extensive data base built up during years of asbestos litigation).
The client is given lists and photographs of asbestos products used at
particular job sites and is instructed to memorize the names and descriptions
of asbestos products: Remember to say you saw the NAMES on the
BAGS.... The more often you were around the product, the better for your
case .. " Should the defendant ask how you (a plaintiff) were able to recall
so many product names, "[t]he best answer is to say that you recall seeing
the names on the containers or on the product itself. The more you thought
about it, the more you remembered!"
The memorandum also gave explicit instructions regarding knowledge
of danger:
It is important to emphasize that you had NO IDEA ASBESTOS
WAS DANGEROUS when you were working around it.... It is
important to maintain that you NEVER saw any labels on asbestos
products that said WARNING or DANGER.... You will be asked
if you ever used respiratory equipment to protect you from asbestos.
Listen carefully to the question! If you did wear a mask for welding
or other fumes that does not mean you wore it for protection from
asbestos! The answer is still 'NO'!
The client is also instructed to say that there were certain products with
which he did not come into contact (the products of bankrupt companies):
"Do not mention product names that are not listed on your Work History
Sheets., 49 The memorandum contains a lengthy discussion of the effects of
asbestos disease and asks the client to think about them: "If you can give
good, concrete examples of how your life has been damaged by your
exposure to asbestos products made by these manufacturers they will want to
offer you a settlement instead of taking the chance that a jury will award you
more money."
On its face the memo appears to "counsel or assist a witness to testify
falsely," since the directions involve the creation of testimony and go far
beyond the neutral stimulation of recollection. If lawyers in Baron & Budd
knew of the use of the memo (suggested by the fact that it was inadvertently
turned over by one lawyer to defense counsel in a pending asbestos case),
those lawyers would at least be culpable for failing to provide proper
supervision to firm paralegals.
50
49. Brickman. Aggregative Litigation, supra note 9, at n.104. As the leading asbestos
manufacturers went bankrupt, it was essential for plaintiff lawyers to find new defendants and
provide evidence that the solvent defendants were largely responsible for the plaintiff's asbestos
condition. Prior evidence that Manville products were dominant in some work settings (perhaps as
high as eighty percent of the products used at some shipbuilding sites) had to be replaced by
testimony that the products of other manufacturers were responsible. See Brickman, Aggregative
Litigation, supra note 9, at 277 n. 105.
50. See Model Rule 5.3(c) (providing that a partner or a supervisory lawyer who knows of
misconduct by a non-lawyer employed by the firm "shall be responsible for conduct of such a person
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After the memorandum became known, lawyers for Baron & Budd
denied knowledge of its use and stated that it had been employed in no more
than 110 cases handled by one paralegal at the firm. That paralegal signed
an affidavit in which she took sole responsibility for writing the memo:
51
According to Parloff, Fred Baron, a name partner of the firm, "argues in an
interview that the memo doesn't actually counsel anything improper,
especially when taken in context with other materials the firm provided to
plaintiffs, which advised them, for instance, to tell the truth." The firm
also argued, ultimately successfully, that the memo, labeled as "Attorney
Work Product," was protected by the attorney-client privilege.53 The firm
was successful in blocking an investigation into the use of the memo,
knowledge of its use by the firm's lawyers, and inquiries of other clients as
to whether they had seen the memo.
54
In civil proceedings, a panel of the Texas appellate court held that the
memo was protected by the attorney-client privilege and the crime-fraud
exception was inapplicable because there was no evidence that the client was
using the lawyer's services to perpetrate a fraud.55  A defense motion to
disqualify Baron & Budd from representing clients in asbestos cases in
Dallas was denied. A referral by a Dallas County judge to Texas
disciplinary authorities resulted in a letter to Fred Baron stating that bar
counsel had dismissed a grievance against him "since it does not state, on its
face, a violation of a disciplinary rule. ' ,56  Academic experts and
that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer").
51. Parloff, Miscarriage of Justice, supra note 4.
52. Id.
53. See h re Brown, 1998 WL 207793, *2 (Tex. App. Apr. 30, 1998) (unpublished opinion
holding that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege did not apply because "[t]here
was no evidence that the clients were aware that the Memo was part of any crime or fraud"). This
interpretation of the crime-fraud exception is unsound and has been rejected by federal court
decisions. See In re Impounded Case (Law Firm). 879 F.2d 121 I. 1213 (3d Cir.1989) (crime-fraud
exception applicable when lawyer, but not the client, engaged in criminal conduct). In Impounded. a
law firm, asserting the privilege on behalf of its innocent clients, claimed that the crime-fraud
exception did not apply when the alleged criminality was solely that of the law firm. Id. The court
rejected the argument, holding that the privilege would have to yield to the societal interest of
bringing to justice lawyers engaged in criminal activities. Id. at 1214. Moreover, use of documents
to refresh a witness' recollection often results in waiver of the privilege. Id.
54. See Walter Olson, Creative Deposition, 34 CIv. JUST. MEMO 3-4 (Manhattan Inst., May
1998) (describing Baron & Budd's efforts to avoid use of the memo against it in other asbestos
cases). But cf. State ex rel. Abner v. Elliott, 706 N.E. 2d 765, 771 (Ohio 1999) (Ohio Supreme
Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Baron & Budd to stop an Ohio trial judge supervising a
large group of asbestos cases from compelling the firm to produce documents and testimony
concerning its witness preparation practices, or face a curative instruction if it did not).
Subsequently Baron & Budd took a voluntary dismissal of its Ohio cases, which were presumably
refiled elsewhere.
55. In re Brown, 1998 WL 207793. at 2*-5* (unpublished opinion).
56. Parloff, Miscarriage of Justice, supra note 4. The Texas trial judge, outraged at the dismissal
of the grievance, referred the matter to a grand jury, but that also ultimately came to nothing. See
Olson, supra note 54.
commentators took opposing views on the question of whether use of the
memorandum was an ethics violation.
57
The ethics rules have very little to say concerning lawyer behavior that
constitutes improper coaching of a witness. The rules are limited, in effect,
to a prohibition of suborning perjured testimony repeated several times in
somewhat different words.58 In the Baron & Budd incident, the absence of a
full factual inquiry left the law firm's assertions unchallenged: a document
that clearly was very aggressive in communicating facts to a client was used
in a number of cases by the single paralegal responsible for it; the firm's
lawyers were unaware of its use, and there was no evidence that false
testimony had been given in any prior cases.
The difficult questions that arise concerning improper coaching involve
a lawyer's recitation to a client of facts required for a recovery prior to
seeking the client's recollections; telling the witness what the facts are or
have to be (e.g., "maintain that you never saw any warning or danger
labels"); or explaining the legal effect of answers in a way that directs the
witness' testimony (e.g., "never give specific quantities of brand names
since that may lead defendants to say that they were not responsible for your
illness"). 59 Existing authority on the subject of improper coaching is almost
entirely confined to clear and egregious instances of suborning perjury. In
the absence of ethics opinions, disciplinary decisions and cases involving
judicial sanctions dealing with improper coaching as an ethics violation,
patterns of "aggressive" coaching are prevalent in many sectors of the
litigation bar. Its presence in asbestos litigation is not surprising, given the
lack of guidance and the special problem that all cases involve asbestos
exposure that took place thirty to forty years ago.
57. Lester Brickman, who served as a defense expert. concluded that parts of the memo violated
Texas ethics rules and suborned perjury; William Hodes. an expert witness for the firm, took an
opposing position. See Ethics of Witness Preparation, 14 ABAIBNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF.
CONDUCT 48, 49-51 (Feb. 18, 1998); see also Lester Brickman & Ronald Rotunda, When Witnesses
Are Told What to Say, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1998, at A-15.
58. Model Rule 1.2(d): "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent." Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) prohibits a lawyer
from "knowingly ... offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer knows to be false .... " Model Rule 3.4(b)
states that a lawyer "shall not ... falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or
offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law .... Model Rule 8.4(c) states that "It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to. . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation."
59. See Liisa Renee Salmi, Don't Walk the Line: Ethical Considerations in Preparing Witnesses
for Deposition and Trial, 18 REV. LIT1G. 135 (1999); Richard Wydick, The Ethics of Witness
Coaching, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. I (1995).
60. See Lawrence J. Fox, Ethics: Beyond the Rules, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 691-895 (1998)
(reporting a substantial study of the tendency of litigators to push procedural rules to their limits.
especially in discovery practice, and sometimes leading to law violations). The study was supported
by the ABA Section of Litigation and carried on by a number of prominent academics, each of
whom wrote an article on the study. Id.
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D. Individualized Justice Versus Mass Justice (Communication with
Clients, the Client's Control of Settlement, and the Aggregate Settlement
Rule)
The recent Rand report summarizes the evolving dynamics of asbestos
litigation in the United States: A period of extensive individual case
litigation eventually resulted in jury verdicts over vigorous manufacturer
opposition. Judicial decisions and statutory developments eased the way on
61proof of exposure, causation of injury, and statutes of limitation.
Litigating individual claims against these major corporations was
expensive and risky for plaintiff law firms and few were willing to
take on asbestos workers' claims. By the mid-1980s, however,
plaintiff law firms in areas of heavy asbestos exposure ... had
learned that they could succeed against asbestos defendants by
filing large numbers of claims, grouping them together and
negotiating with defendants on behalf of the entire group. Often
defendants would agree to settle all the claims that were so grouped,
including those claims that were questionable, to reduce their
overall costs of litigation. By agreeing to pay questionable smaller-
value claims in exchange for also settling stronger and larger-value
claims, defendants could also contain their financial risk. Some
plaintiffs might receive lower values for claims that were settled as
part of a group. But litigating claims en masse lowered the cost and
risk per claim for plaintiff law firms.
62
This strategy required the recruitment of claimants that has already been
described. The efforts of courts to handle the flood of new cases led to the
consolidation of cases first for pre-trial but eventually for trial as well.
Large group settlements were encouraged by such consolidation.
"Typically, cases were consolidated by law firms representing the plaintiffs
or by plaintiffs' place of employment, not by injury severity or strength of
the legal claim.
'
_
As some corporations emerged from bankruptcy and established
trusts to pay claims, the bankruptcy trust administrators also
developed claims processing procedures that would minimize
transaction costs.... In this way, asbestos litigation was
transformed in fact - although not in form - into a quasi-
administrative regime, with some, if not all, of the transaction cost
61. 2002 Rand Report, supra note 1. at 22-23.
62. Id. at 22-23.
63. Id. at 25.
benefits that one would expect as a result of such a
transformation. 64
"Importantly, reducing per-case transaction costs made filing small
claims financially viable for more people, thereby encouraging mass filings
... [I]t is highly likely that the steps taken to streamline the litigation actually
increased the total dollars spent on the litigation by increasing the numbers
of claims filed and resolved. 65
These changes were accompanied by a greater concentration of asbestos
cases in a small number of plaintiff law firms. "By 1995, ten firms...
represented three quarters of the annual filings against defendants .... The
leading firms had standing settlement agreements with the major defendants.
Virtually all cases settled."
66
Asbestos litigation also tends to be concentrated in a small number of
states, although their identity has shifted over time as litigation dynamics
have changed: relaxed venue rules, consolidation practices perceived to
benefit plaintiffs, and perceptions that particular locales were especially
"plaintiff friendly." 65 From 1998-2000 two-thirds of all asbestos filings were
concentrated in five states: Texas, Mississippi, New York, Ohio, and West
Virginia, in that order. Mississippi and West Virginia, although they have
less than two percent of the U.S. population, received almost one-quarter of
the 1998-2000 filings. Three jurisdictions which permit joinder of any
asbestos case against the same defendants with a case in which the plaintiff
is a resident or was exposed to asbestos .within the state (Texas, Mississippi
and West Virginia) are now receiving over forty percent of new filings.68
The American tradition of individualized justice (the right of every
person to due process and a jury trial) is also reflected in the single client-
single lawyer focus of the legal profession's ethics rules. Since the 1960s,
however, there has been an enormous growth in collective litigation: class
actions were spurred by the rule changes of 1963 and other developments;
and consolidation practices have evolved that would have been unthinkable
forty years ago. Recently, the Supreme Court declined to stop a West
Virginia asbestos proceeding which originally involved joinder of more than
8,000 asbestos plaintiffs and 259 defendants. 9 The exposure, causation, and
injury circumstances of many plaintiffs were individual and unique; the
64. Id. at 26.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 30.
67. Id. at 32-37 (discussing concentration of asbestos litigation in a relatively small number of
states; the migration of those cases from one group of states to another and from federal courts to
states influenced by perceptions that certain state courts provided a more "plaintiff friendly"
environment; and the large number of cases brought in a small number of counties (sometimes
referred to as "magnet courts")).
68. Id. Until reform legislation was enacted in 2003, trial courts in Mississippi lacked authority
to order an independent medical examinations of plaintiffs, a rule that helps plaintiffs and hurts
defendants. Thirteen percent of total asbestos filings from 1998-2000 were in two Mississippi
counties. Id.
69. See Lisa Starsky, Unusual Battle in W.Va. Asbestos Case. 24 NAT'L L.J. No. 58, Oct. 28,
2002, at A12, A14.
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plaintiffs resided and had been occupationally exposed in a number of
different states, although a majority were occupationally exposed in West
Virginia; the defendants had little in common except that each was alleged
to be responsible in part for the plaintiffs' injuries. After the West Virginia
Supreme Court failed to stop the consolidated trial, most of the defendants
settled. When the US. Supreme Court also refused to address the
defendants' due process argument, all the remaining defendants except one
settled. A jury verdict on the liability phase was later rendered against Union
Carbide, the only defendant left standing.70
For a number of years some of the leading judges and academics who
supported collective litigation have argued that procedural and ethical rules
should not stand in the way of developments that are thought to be more
efficient and fairer than individual adjudication with its high transaction
costs and erratic verdicts. The degree of autonomy granted to individual
litigants, they argue, is inconsistent with collective justice, in which the
plaintiff lawyer (whether class counsel or the lawyer for a thousand
claimants in a consolidated proceeding) necessarily must exercise a degree
of control in formulating strategy for the group as a whole, making decisions
that compromise the claims of some members of the group, and deciding
whether and on what terms to settle the proceeding.7 ' The increased
efficiency of aggregative procedures provides a "rough justice" that is better
than an individualized justice that is ineffective because of cost and delay.
An opposing school of thought is troubled by the quick expansion of
aggregative methods and their many problems: the inability of claimants to
effectively monitor the conduct of the lawyer for the class or aggregation;
the tendency of the plaintiff attorney to make decisions on the basis of the
timing and amount of fees to be earned in relation to the legal effort
required; a willingness of many such attorneys to make collusive deals with
defendants that sacrifice the interests of plaintiffs who have valuable claims;
the conflicts of interest within the agregation over which the attorney is
given virtually unchecked discretion.7
1. The lawyer's duty of communication
Model Rule 1.4, as revised in 2002, now contains an expanded
statement of what constitutes the "reasonable communication" necessary for
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 84-88 (1995)
[hereinafter Weinstein, Mass Tort Litigationl; Carrie Menkel-Meadow. Ethics and the Settlement of
Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1213 (1995) [hereinafter
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Settlement of Mass TortsI.
72. See, e.g., Moore. Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note 13; Susan P. Koniak,
Feasting While the Widow Weep: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045
(1995).
the client effectively to participate in the representation. The rule now
requires a lawyer to communicate "promptly" on two matters: any decision
or circumstance that requires the client's informed consent (including the
client's authority as to "whether to settle a matter") and the client's
reasonable requests for information. "Reasonable" information or
consultation is required about the means by which the client's objectives are
to be accomplished and the status of the matter. In addition, the lawyer must
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation and consult with the
client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer
knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the rules or other
law,
Judge Weinstein is among those commentators who believe that mass
tort actions are here to stay and that they provide a rough justice, more
satisfactory than the results of the traditional tort approach with its erratic
results, windfalls, and enormous delays. Weinstein states:
The mass tort lawyer cannot deal with his or her clients on a
one-to-one basis that permits full client participation in the
litigation. This diffuse relationship inevitably will yield some level
of client dissatisfaction and, because of compromises the attorney
must make to formulate strategy for the group as a whole, may
result in less-than-zealous advocacy for positions of particular
clients.73
Weinstein concludes that the virtues of aggregative litigation outweigh
the benefits of individual representation and client autonomy. Ethics rules
should be relaxed or modified accordingly. A number of academic
commentators agree.74 The principal focus of attention with respect to
consolidations of the individual cases of numerous plaintiffs represented by
a single law firm, as distinct from class actions, is the profession's rule
concerning aggregate settlements. But the challenge also deals with other
rights of the individual client, including the duty of communication and
avoidance of serious conflicts of interest in simultaneous representation.
Judge Weinstein and others believe that it is not possible for a lawyer to
provide adequate communication to a large number of individual clients who
have a common attorney in a single matter, such as an asbestos case in
which many claimants are suing a score of asbestos defendants.7 5 Nancy
Moore and Steve Jensen, on the other hand, argue that the duty of
communication is more flexible than its critics suggest and that individual
clients can be kept informed through a variety of techniques: e.g., group
meetings, distribution of information by mail and e-mail, telephone
responses by paralegals to inquiries, and use of referring attorneys, when
73. WEINSTEIN, MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 71, at 85.
74. See, e.g., MenkeI-Meadow, Settlement of Mass Torts, supra note 71; Silver & Baker,
Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note 13.
75. Weinstein, Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 71, at 85.
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they are involved, to keep their individual clients informed. I agree with
Moore and Jensen that the case for modification of the duty of
communication has not been made.
The agreements that many plaintiff asbestos firms have made with
various asbestos defendants present a special issue of client communication.
A new client whose asbestos exposure is covered by such an agreement will
receive a predetermined amount from those defendants. A client in that
position should be informed at the outset of any such agreements and of its
significance on the timing and amount of any recovery. I have no
information on how the problem is currently being handled.
2. The aggregate settlement rule
Model Rule 1.8(g) provides:
[a] lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not
participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims
for or against the clients . . . , unless each client gives
informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The
lawyer's disclosure shall include the existence and nature
of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation
of each person in the settlement.
The rule has received very little attention in the courts or academic
literature. An initial and highly useful illumination of the rule and its threat
to aggregative litigation has been provided by Charles Silver and Lynn
Baker.77 They argue that the rule is a grave threat to aggregative litigation
and that it should be modified by permitting a lawyer to obtain an advance
and irrevocable authority to settle the case without further consultation when
the settlement is approved by a majority or super-majority of participating
plaintiffs.78  The change is necessary, they argue, because individual
consultation with hundreds or thousands of individual clients is not feasible
and the group commitment to a negotiated settlement provides the attorney
with the leverage against defendants that is required to obtain an adequate
settlement.
Nancy Moore has criticized the proposed reform. 79 She argues that the
communication and aggregate settlement rules are more flexible than Silver
and Baker recognize and that the denial of any sense of individual
76. Moore, Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note 13, at 161-62; Jensen, Old-
Fashioned Ethics, supra note 13, 223-25.
77. Silver & Baker, Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note 13; Baker & Silver. Settlement Rule
and Ideals of Client Service, supra note 13.
78. Silver & Baker, Aggregate Settlement Rule. supra note 13, at 778-79.
79. Moore, Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note 13.
participation comes at too high a cost, especially given the dangers of self-
interested behavior on the part of the lawyers who have created and control
these aggregative cases. I agree with her. The dangers of self-interested,
and even collusive, behavior by plaintiff lawyers have been recognized as a
serious problem in class action cases. Consolidated cases that involve
hundreds or thousands of claimants involve an even greater problem because
all of the protections of class actions have been eliminated: the lawyer
representing the aggregated individual plaintiffs is self-appointed, not
selected by the court; there is no screening of cases by the certification
requirement; the right of a class member in a personal injury class action to
opt out at the time of notice (and perhaps at the settlement stage as well)80 is
not available in the aggregated case context; the judge must consider and
approve the adequacy and fairness of the class action settlement, but has
limited or no control over an aggregated settlement; finally, the judge in the
class action must approve class counsel's fee, a right that has no parallel
when individual litigation is involved. All of these important procedural
rights are lacking in the consolidated action.
The paper prepared by Charles Silver for this symposium argues that
mass tort lawyers (including both class counsel and lawyers who represent
many claimants in an aggregated proceeding) are motivated primarily to
maximize the total amount available to the class or plaintiff aggregation.
81
Therefore, it is in the best interest of the class or group to have a lawyer who
has wide discretion to craft a settlement providing a maximum recovery,
even though some individuals and groups within the class may be less well
treated than they would be in litigation. He does not discuss the
overwhelming evidence that class counsel are motivated by total return from
their point of view, a calculus that takes into account the effort required and
the timing and amount of the attorney fee. 82 Nor does he discuss the large
amount of evidence that suggests class counsel is under great pressure to
make collusive deals with defendants to prevent the defendants from dealing
with lawyers for competing classes.
While the latter problem is less evident in lawyer representation of large
aggregations of asbestos claimants, the major disconnect between the
interest of the group and that of their lawyer is even stronger because of the
lawyer's lack of any control in Silver's scheme of things. Silver wants the
80. The proposed changes in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include the right of
a class member to opt out when given notice of the settlement of the class action.
81. Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees, 31 Pepp. L. Rev.
(forthcoming Dec. 2003).
82. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountabilitv: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyaltv in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 399 (2000); John C. Coffee Jr., Class
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); Koniak, supra
note 72; Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051
(1996) (noting prevalence of collusive settlements).
83. The characterization of a lawyer as a "trustee" suggests fiduciary duties to beneficiaries and a
tribunal to enforce those duties. The law of trusts is an arena in which trustees are supervised by a
court in everything they do, required to make periodic reports to the court, and their fees approved
by the court. Silver adopts the term "trustee" but not in its regulatory context. The lawyer for the
claimants that the lawyer has aggregated are left without any supervision or control except the after-
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lawyer for the aggregate to possess all the power and authority of class
counsel while being totally unregulated: the lawyer recruits the claimants
and is not selected by the trial judge; there is no certification procedure to
determine whether aggregated treatment is appropriate and fair to all
plaintiffs and all defendants; members of the group have no right to opt out
at any stage, including at the time they learn of their participation in the
group settlement; no judge will review the fairness and adequacy of the
settlement; and the lawyer's fees need not and will not be approved by the
court.
If a lawyer wants the degree of authority that Silver would invest in that
lawyer, the lawyer should bring the case as a class action rather than pushing
for a consolidated proceeding of many individual cases. The latter approach
is taken by most plaintiff asbestos firms, I believe, precisely because their
fees in such proceedings are unregulated. They know that a class action
settlement of many millions of dollars would result in an attorney's fee of
perhaps ten percent of the award, not the one-third or more that results from
the aggregated proceeding.
In short, the lawyer who chooses to aggregate individual cases should be
judged by all of the procedural and ethical rules applicable to individual
representation.
The most troubling aspect of the Silver and Baker proposal is the
elimination of a client's right to revoke settlement authority and to discharge
the lawyer. This is tolerated in the class action context because of the opt-
out rights and the other protections provided by class action procedure.
When those are taken away, the individual client is left at the mercy of
lawyers who are likely to act in a self-interested fashion knowing that
judicial scrutiny will not occur. Moreover, the individual client will provide
an irrevocable consent to a settlement that has majority approval when the
client signs the retainer agreement. Individual personal injury clients are not
in a position to make an informed decision when they first meet with a
lawyer, and I doubt very much whether the mass recruitment techniques that
enlist them provide adequate information and consultation on the settlement
issue.
Although the aggregate settlement rule appears to be frequently
violated, the rule is almost never enforced. Nearly all the few cases
discussing aggregate settlement problems arise in situations where a judge is
required to pass on a settlement, such as in a bankruptcy proceeding or a
shareholder's derivative action. I am aware of only one case in which a
lawyer was disciplined for violation of the aggregate settlement rule; in that
the-fact possibility, exceedingly unlikely, of a malpractice action by an unsatisfied former client and
the even less likely prospect of a disciplinary proceeding.
84. See, e.g.. In re Jaeger, 213 B.R. 578 (Bankr. C. D. Cal. 1997).
case it was only one of multiple and serious grounds for discipline." The
absence of academic discussion of the rule reflects the fact that violations
are almost never pursued. Defendants and their lawyers, who induce the
violation, will not raise the issue; and individual plaintiffs affected by it
rarely have the knowledge and resources to file a malpractice action against
their former lawyer or file a disciplinary grievance. Judges eager to clear
their dockets ignore the issue. The aggregate settlement rule, like the duty of
a lawyer to report the misconduct of another lawyer, 86 is at odds with day-
by-day law practice. That deficiency in enforcement should be remedied.
Judges presumably have inherent authority to vacate an aggregate settlement
that involves a violation of a client's rights, but they are disinclined to
exercise that authority in the absence of client complaint.
E. Conflicts of Interest
Conflict of interest problems in aggregative litigation have been
endemic for a long time. The Supreme Court decisions in Amchem Products
Inc. v. Windsor87 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.88 dealt with two
troublesome conflicts of interest that arise in settlement class actions
attempting to provide a global solution for asbestos claims that will be filed
in the future. In Amchem, the Court held that class counsel did not provide
adequate representation when it represented a class consisting of both
currently injured asbestos victims and persons occupationally exposed to
asbestos who had not yet suffered injury but might do so in the future. The
common representation of those currently injured and "futures" provided
"no structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse
groups.. .affected .... 1,89
Two years later in Ortiz the Court considered the even more serious
conflict faced by class counsel who simultaneously negotiated a settlement
of a large inventory of individual asbestos cases and a class action that
provided different and probably less generous terms for future claims. Ortiz
did not condemn intraclass allocations made as such, but found that the class
settlement was "deficient" and lacked "fairness" and "equity" because of the
conflict of interest of class counsel in negotiating both the inventory
settlements and the class action settlement. The two cases suggested that the
use of the class action device to provide a global solution of the asbestos
problem, one that would deal with the claims of "futures" (i.e., exposed
persons not currently injured who might later develop an injury) as well as
those who are now injured, might be impossible.
85. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Watson, 897 P.2d 246, 252-53 (Okla. 1994) (lawyer
disciplined for lying to clients and failing to maintain proper accounts; violation of aggregate
settlement rule mentioned in passing).
86. See Model Rule 8.3.
87. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
88. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
89. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 594.
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Lawyers who aggregate the individual claims of many asbestos
plaintiffs in a consolidated case face some of the same conflicts of interest
considered in Amchem, but not the most. severe one: the inclusion in the
class actions of those who have not yet suffered a legal injury but may have
such an injury in the future. Nevertheless, the interests of those who are
severely impaired (the minority of individual claimants who have
mesothelioma, another cancer caused by asbestos exposure, or very severe
asbestosis) are not the same as those of the vast bulk of claimants who have
a legal injury from asbestos exposure but have suffered no current
impairment of the ability to carry on daily life or an extremely modest
impairment.9° The universal experience in settlements of either class actions
or aggregated cases is that the most severely injured claims of malignancy
are reduced in value in order to provide funds for those with questionable or
less severe claims. The defendants want a total settlement of all or nearly all
outstanding claims, and the price of that settlement is the "rough justice" of
reducing compensation for the one group to provide it to the other.9 1
A further conflict of interest arises for those plaintiff firms that are
engaged both in negotiating large scale class action settlements on a state or
national level (e.g., Ness Motley) while also handling huge numbers of
individual cases. This simultaneous representation sometimes results in the
same firm agreeing to abandon punitive damages for members of the class
while simultaneously asserting such claims in damae cases involving
individual claimants, who may be members of the class. The same type of
conflict may arise with respect to other issues that arise in the two
procedural contexts.
Amchem and Ortiz were litigated because several wealthy plaintiff
asbestos firms, committed to aggregation of individual asbestos claims, were
threatened with loss of their future business by class action settlements that
provided for administrative resolution of future claims and capped attorneys'
fees at a low level. These lawyers had the resources and know-how to
intervene in the class action proceedings and mount a broad attack on the
two settlements. They spent millions of dollars in building records in the
trial court and successfully prosecuting the appeals all the way to the
Supreme Court. Their success in overturning both settlements will probably
be more than recouped in their earnings from handling future asbestos
90. 2002 Rand Report, supra note 1, at 64-65 (summarizing 1991-2000 data). The study
estimates that mesothelioma claims (three percent of total claims) receive about seventeen percent of
total compensation; other malignancy claims (seven percent of total claims) receive about eighteen
percent of total compensation; and nonmalignant claims (eighty-nine percent of total claims) receive
almost two-thirds of total compensation, sixty-five percent.
91. See id.
92. See Cramton, supra note 12, at 446 n.49 (2001) (discussing a case in which Ness Motley was
involved in the simultaneous representation context in its tobacco victim representation).
claimants in their preferred manner: the quasi-administrative process of
handling a large number of individual cases using aggregative methods.
In the normal situation conflict of interest questions are much less likely
to be raised and successfully litigated. Defendants, eager to obtain
something as close to global peace as possible, will not raise the issues.
Individual claimants lack neither the information nor the resources to mount
such an attack; disciplinary authorities generally have neither the resources
nor will to deal with such complex factual situations, even if a grievance
were to be filed.93  In the absence of large divisions within the tightly
concentrated plaintiff asbestos bar, these questions are unlikely to be raised
and litigated.
F. Reasonableness of Fees
Transaction costs in asbestos litigation are extremely large. The 1983
Rand Study concluded that asbestos claimants received about thirty-four
percent of the dollars expended by defendants and insurers in handling
asbestos litigation; about sixty-six percent of the billions of dollars involved
was devoted to litigation costs and plaintiff attorney fees. 9 4 Defense costs at
that time were considerably larger than those of plaintiff expenses and fees.
Rand's 2002 study estimates that the total outlay on asbestos claims
through 2000 was about $54 billion, with asbestos defendants pying about
$20-24 billion and their insurers paying the remainder. Analysts'
projections of total claimants and costs vary dramatically but range from one
to three million claimants and total cost of between $200 billion to $265
billion.
96
Transaction costs have declined somewhat since 1983 but the decline
has been entirely on the defense side, which has benefited from joint defense
efforts, insurance coverage agreements, and agreements with many plaintiff
firms to settle claims according to a schedule of payments by claim type.
97
As a result, the share of total costs that plaintiffs receive as compensation
has increased to about forty-three percent of the total, with transaction costs
consuming the remaining fifty-seven percent. Rand concludes "the
proportion of the money paid claimants that went to plaintiffs' attorneys
remained the same [approximately thirty-one percent of total CoStS]."
98
Informed interviewees "said that they had not seen any evidence that
plaintiff attorneys' fees were reduced." 99
93. Note that Texas bar authorities apparently dismissed a grievance complaint conceming the
Baron & Budd deposition preparation practices without a detailed factual inquiry into the actual use
of the memorandum in question, knowledge of the memo or its use of lawyers in the firm, and
testimony of former clients who had been given the memo. See the discussion supra notes 48-60
and accompanying text.
94. 2002 Rand Report, supra note 1, at 60 (summarizing the 1983 data).
95. Id. at 52-55.
96. id. at 77-78.
97. Id. at 60-61.
98. Id. at 61.
99. Id.
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The experience of the Manville Trust, one of the trusts established by a
bankrupt asbestos defendant to assume claims liability, indicates that
average operating expenses are about five percent of the total cost of the
claims process (dollars paid to asbestos claimants plus the Trust's
administrative expenses).' 0  Attorneys' fees are limited to no more than
twenty-five percent and claimants received about seventy percent of the total
dollars spent by the Trust. The results indicate the savings that are possible
through an administrative compensation system.
The flow of compensation to claimants through disease schedules,
embodied in the bankruptcy trusts and in the many settlement agreements
solvent defendants have made with many plaintiff firms, raises the question
of why the share of total costs spent on plaintiff attorney expenses and fees
has remained constant over time and not decreased, as defense costs have.
Are current attorneys' fees in asbestos litigation reasonable and not
excessive?
There are reasons why plaintiff attorney fees in the asbestos field may
be unresponsive to competitive forces. As indicated earlier, asbestos
litigation is concentrated primarily in ten plaintiff law firms with another ten
or so firms handling nearly all of the remainder. Some of these firms litigate
in only one or a few jurisdictions; a few operate nationwide. New entrants
are limited to attorneys, trained in one of the existing firms, who go out on
their own. The costs of entry are high: a large information base of work
sites at which asbestos products were manufactured, assembled or handled
has to be assembled; relations with union officials, other worker
representatives, and referring attorneys have to be established; a reputation
must be built that leads major defendants to extend their standing
agreements to a newcomer. Moreover, trends in asbestos litigation may be
increasing risk and cost: the shrinkage by bankruptcy of defendants with
large culpability or large asbestos involvement makes pursuit of new
defendants, who have less culpability and market presence, more risky and
costly: the recruitment of new claimants by extensive media advertising may
be necessary but involves great expense.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that price competition is
not evident either in lawyer advertising in the asbestos field or in the
comments of the informed individuals interviewed by Rand. The indications
are that the one-third contingency fee (forty percent when a referral lawyer
is involved) continues to be prevalent. Newcomers, who bear large entry
costs, compete in terms of service rather than price, needing the cushion of
current fee levels to finance some of the entry costs. The structural factors
that have been mentioned dampen price competition. An alternative thesis is
100. Id. at 62 (reporting data from 1994-2000).
that asbestos litigation, like a number of other service fields, is a "winners
take all" market.'01
Model Rule 1.5(a) requires that "a lawyer shall not make an agreement
for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for
expenses." The reasonableness of a fee is determined by a laundry list of
eight factors which point in different directions and make the ultimate
conclusion indeterminate and subjective. Except in situations of egregious
overreaching of individual and uninformed clients, disciplinary enforcement
of the requirement is virtually nonexistent. Fee litigation (e.g., former client
versus lawyer) is the primary mechanism by which fee issues are contested
and come to light. Special situations, such as class actions, in which a judge
must approve the fee, sometimes lead to fee litigation in which a lawyer
intervener, representing one or more class members, challenges class
counsel's fee requests. None of these enforcement mechanisms are set up to
determine whether or not there are market imperfections that make plaintiff
attorneys' fees in asbestos litigation excessive and unreasonable. A
foundation for confident judgments about the reasonableness of current
asbestos litigation fees can only be made if empirical research provides more
information.
III. CONCLUSION
The injuries caused by occupational exposure to asbestos caused the
early deaths of more than 225,000 Americans.10 2 The corporate malefactors
that concealed the dangers of asbestos from their workers inflicted a great
harm on them as well as the society as a whole. Yet the justifiable desire to
punish the wrongdoers and compensate the victims has led to a litigation
regime that fails to achieve any of the objectives of the tort system. Many of
the most seriously harmed victims die before the legal system provides them
with a remedy; those that survive receive reduced compensation because the
system that has been created attempts to compensate everyone that can
successfully claim exposure whether or not they have suffered an
impairment that adversely affects the activities of daily living. Special
liability rules relating to proof of exposure and compensation lead asbestos
litigation to be concentrated in a relatively small number of court systems,
many of which also offer plaintiffs with favorable venue rules, procedural
practices that favor plaintiffs by aggregating claims, and plaintiff-friendly
judges and juries. In combination, some of these developments implicate
due process and "rule of law" concerns.
Deterrence objectives are no longer served by asbestos litigation. The
defendants who engaged in wrongdoing many years ago have disappeared
from the scene; asbestos itself disappeared from the marketplace nearly
101. See ROBERT FRANK & PHILIP COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY, passim (Free Press
1995) (market characteristics in business, law, entertainment and many other sectors lead to a limited
number of people in superstar positions reaping huge rewards, which has adverse effects on the
economy and society).
102. 2002 Rand Report, supra note I, at 16.
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thirty years ago. The defendants today are a large and expanding group of
companies that had some role in using an asbestos component, selling or
distributing such a product, or acquiring a company that brought with it
some asbestos liability. The costs of asbestos litigation today fall primarily
on those many companies and their insurers, and both categories of deep
pockets are in danger of ultimate bankruptcy. Their shareholders will be the
ultimate losers.
The conduct of lawyers engaged in the prosecution or defense of
asbestos claims is not a pleasant or edifying subject. The failure of Congress
to enact an administrative compensation system has put asbestos lawyers in
a situation of doing the best they can under difficult circumstances. Like
most lawyers, they are primarily interested in the field because of its
potential of providing everything from a good living to great wealth. Many
of these self-interested actors have displayed great ingenuity in their
attempts to devise substitutes for the absence of a compensation system of
legislative creation. Sometimes their work has placed in doubt the
fundamental rights of the justice system or threatened the rule of law by
turning private deals between interested parties (class counsel and corporate
defendants) into massive public regulatory schemes.
As this paper has shown, the legal profession's ethics rules are relevant
to a number of aspects of asbestos litigation. The rules appear to have a
clear purpose only rarely and with respect to some issues, especially
conflicts of interest and the aggregate settlement rule. Yet even there the
rules are rarely discussed and almost never applied. On other issues, such as
the mass recruitment of clients, the coaching or improper use of testimony,
and the reasonableness of fees, suspicious circumstances abound but there is
insufficient empirical evidence to determine whether professional rules that
are rarely enforced are in fact being violated.
202
